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Abstract 
There is some consensus that the traditional energy-only electricity markets, where prices are based on 
system marginal cost, cannot function efficiently with both fossil fuels and renewables, resulting in 
market disruptions and price volatility. Consequently, much effort has been focused on how to 
integrate these different resources in larger and mature electricity systems such as the use of capacity 
markets in addition to energy-only markets. This paper argues that the effectiveness of competition is 
limited by the size of an electricity system and there is a threshold size (and associated characteristics 
such as tropical locations, lack of access, and the prevalence of remote communities of consumers) 
below which competition will not produce the expected outcomes. This paper contributes to the policy 
discourse by discussing the reform of small electricity systems to integrate renewable energy via the 
means of three case studies: Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Australia’s Northern Territory. The paper 
concludes that electricity reforms and renewables can be complementary in small systems when 
supported by appropriate instruments and incentives. We draw policy lessons for other small systems 
that are pursuing a triad of objectives including electricity reform, large-scale renewables development 
and improving energy access. 
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1. Introduction 
The global energy landscape and operating environment of the electricity supply 
industry (ESI) are undergoing a slow but certain transformation. The electricity sector is 
waking up to new disruptions occurring at the grid edge (Arriaga et al., 2017). 
Distributed energy, clean energy demand and technological progress are reshaping the 
traditional, centralized fossil fuel-based electricity systems, to accommodate variable 
renewables and other network-related loads (Sioshansi, 2017). The number of 
consumers becoming ‘prosumers’1, either through improvements in energy efficiency, or 
through distributed energy resources, is also on the rise. These changes will become 
more pronounced as energy storage advances into a viable grid-based resource. 
Falling wholesale energy prices at a time of rising generation costs, stagnant energy 
demand growth and growing penetration of renewable energy and other distributed 
energy resources are part of the transformation (Sioshansi, 2015). These 
transformations were not anticipated by policy-makers advocating market-based 
reforms in the early 1990s. The latter were largely motivated by the breakdown of the 
traditional economies of scale argument associated with vertical integration of the 
electricity supply industry, and the potential for competition to lower prices, 
encouraging innovation in generation and retail supply. “Competition where feasible, 
regulation where not” was the overriding principle of market-based reforms (Newbery, 
2002). Electricity sector restructuring, when coupled with effective regulation and 
competition, was expected to deliver significant consumer benefits when designed and 
implemented well (Joskow, 2003). 
                                                          
1 A ‘prosumer’ is an economic agent such as a household that supplies excess energy produced to the grid 
(producer) but also consumes electricity from the grid (consumer). 
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Policy attention of late has also focused on the suitability of electricity market reform 
carried under the ‘standard’ or prescriptive approach – the end result of which is market 
liberalization – for the integration of intermittent renewables. There is a growing 
concern that traditional energy-only electricity markets where price and investment 
signals are based on system marginal cost cannot function efficiently with both fossil 
fuels and renewables. The former have high marginal costs and the latter have zero 
marginal costs, potentially resulting in market disruptions and price volatility. 
Consequently, policy has focused on finding new ways to integrate renewables and fossil 
fuels through adopting competitive solutions (such as the use of capacity markets in 
addition to energy-only markets) (Sen et al., 2016). 
A generic high-level reform of the ESI (the “standard approach” involves steps such as: 
corporatisation, vertical unbundling (separation) and restructuring of the sector, 
introducing competition in the wholesale generation, horizontal separation of 
incumbents to create competition, establishing an independent regulatory authority, 
and privatization of competitive segments of the ESI (Jamasb et al., 2017). The extent of 
vertical separation has varied across functional, accounting, legal, or ownership 
separation. Vertical separation was also expected to prevent cross-subsidization 
between competitive segments and regulated network businesses, and discriminatory 
behaviour such as denial of access to networks (Joskow, 1998). However, policymakers 
and scholars have not adequately addressed the central question of “what are the 
implications of a small electricity system on the effectiveness of market-oriented 
reforms?” 
This paper argues that the effectiveness of reform and competition is limited by the size 
of an electricity system – in other words, there is a threshold size (and associated 
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characteristics) under which competition by itself will not produce the expected 
outcomes, and for which distinct policy solutions are required to resolve the problems of 
scaling up and integrating renewables. Small and isolated systems have characteristics 
which imply that the economic rationale underpinning the reform of large electricity 
systems is not readily applicable to them, as the benefits from increased competition are 
limited. Yet, this has not deterred policymakers from attempting the “standard 
approach” to reforms in small systems, recently including, for instance, Australia’s 
Northern Territory electricity market (Nepal and Menezes, 2017). Simultaneously, many 
countries (or territories) with small systems have ambitious renewable energy targets, 
and in principle face similar policy problems as “larger” or more conventional electricity 
systems, although the drivers behind these targets are related to electricity access for 
remote communities rather than decarbonisation per se. 
The absence of prior literature on electricity reforms which accounts for the issues of 
small systems implies limited scope for learning from previous experience from such 
systems. Yet they account for a small but important number of countries in the Asia 
Pacific, South East Asia and the Caribbean. These countries are particularly vulnerable to 
climate change, and their reform objectives have included market restructuring 
alongside improving access and scaling up renewables (Nepal and Jamasb, 2012a; Nepal 
and Menezes, 2017).  
This study attempts to fill the gap in literature by reviewing policy experience in three 
small electricity systems: two of these – Nicaragua and El Salvador - have successfully 
integrated renewables to over 50% of generation within a few years. Based on these 
countries’ experience, we identify a number of practical policy solutions. We propose 
that a third, Australia’s Northern Territory, closely fits the generic case for the adoption 
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of a similar approach, as the Territory has adopted an ambitious renewable energy 
target in the midst of ongoing power sector reforms. We conclude with policy options 
for countries or territories which face the problem of reforming electricity markets to 
integrate renewables, and which fit the characteristics of small electricity systems. 
We suggest that electricity sector reforms and renewables can be complementary when 
supported by appropriate instruments and incentives in small systems. A sophisticated 
regulatory institutional framework is desirable, but is neither a necessary condition nor 
a guarantee for successful renewable energy development. Private sector investments 
can (but not necessarily always) correlate with a high share of renewables. 
The remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 2 outlines the characteristics of small 
electricity systems and sets out the preliminary arguments on why these could adopt 
renewables integration alongside the ‘standard’ electricity reform model. Section 3 
presents case studies on Nicaragua and El Salvador – two successful cases of electricity 
market reform and renewables integration in small systems - and Australia’s Northern 
Territory. It documents existing policies and arrangements for renewable energy 
development in these markets. Section 4 synthesises policy lessons drawn from the case 
studies, applicable to other small electricity systems globally. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. The Characteristics of Small Electricity Systems 
Several small systems have undertaken the process of restructuring their sectors to 
introduce greater competition riding on the ‘wave’ of popularity of electricity market 
reforms that were initiated and spread worldwide in the 1990s. Examples include 
countries in Africa, and small economies and territories in the Caribbean and the Pacific 
(Weisser, 2004). In this section, we discuss the features of small electricity systems and 
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summarize the literature addressing the unsuitability of electricity reforms in the 
scaling and integration of renewables. 
“Small” electricity systems can be defined by a set of distinct characteristics. In absolute 
terms, the literature defines a small electricity system as one that has an installed 
electricity capacity of below 1,000 Megawatts (MW) (Besant-Jones, 2006). This is, 
however, not the sole characteristic. An electricity system can also be considered 
“smaller” relative to a wider electricity market. This could include a system situated 
within a country (such as the provincial markets in Australia), or within a wider region 
(such as individual systems within a transnational network – for instance the countries 
within Latin America’s SIEPAC network) which accounts for a small proportion of that 
overall system. The Single Electricity Market (SEM) in Ireland is an example of a smaller 
and isolated market in the European context (Nepal and Jamasb, 2012b). An important 
trend including some small power systems globally is the formation of power trade 
areas with neighbouring countries and are summarised in USAID (2016). 
In many small systems, energy demand is often too low (and the demand base is too 
small) to allow the benefits of greater competition to manifest – for instance, through 
the lowering of electricity prices. Small electricity systems are also sensitive to the 
impact of large foreign investors and developers in electricity generation and 
distribution (Besant-Jones, 2006). The benefits of greater competition in small 
electricity systems may be lower than the transaction costs involved in fostering 
competition. Alternatively, the benefits of greater competition in small systems may be 
lower than the benefits obtained from economies of coordination and scope under 
vertical integration. The costs of vertical separation may be so large to offset the gains 
from competition even when it is possible to introduce limited competition in 
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generation and achieve some benefits (Bacon, 1994). Hence, countries with small 
systems can have intermediate reform options although some degree of vertical 
separation is likely to improve quality of services and lower costs. 
Many small systems are geographically distinctive, and prevalent largely among 
countries in the tropics with higher energy demand (Central America, the Asia- Pacific 
and the Caribbean). Given their often maritime locations and vulnerability to the 
impacts of climate change and oil market volatility, many small systems have adopted 
ambitious renewable targets. Small systems in the tropics often host remote 
communities with relatively poor electricity access. Finally, small systems in the tropics 
generally have other reliable resources of renewables to draw on, such as 
continuous/more predictable solar, and often hydro, rather than solely relying on 
imported fossil fuels. As of 2014, there were around 88 small electricity systems in the 
world measured in terms of installed generation capacities (see Table 1A). These small 
systems are predominantly located in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific.2 An earlier 
study by Bacon and Besant-Jones (2001) had estimated that around 100 countries have 
power systems smaller than 1000 MW. 
Given the distinctive characteristics of small electricity systems, market-based reform 
may have lesser relevance to such systems (Bacon, 1994). The “standard” or 
prescriptive model of electricity reforms – which is based on moving to liberalised 
markets with prices set according to system marginal cost – is debated in the literature 
as being unsuited to the integration and scaling up of renewables (Keay et al., 2013; Sen, 
2014; Sen et al, 2016). In order to summarise this debate, in energy-only markets that 
                                                          
2 Some small island economies also have small electricity systems. However, the implications of reforms in 
island economies is a body of literature in itself and hence is not the focus of this paper. See, e.g., Niles and 
Lloyd (2014), Dornan (2015) and Timilsina and Shah (2016). 
8 
 
were originally designed for fossil fuels, where prices are set based on system marginal 
costs, the incorporation of zero marginal cost renewables can potentially lead to price 
volatility, as prices would be zero (or very low) during periods when renewables are 
plentiful (i.e., the sun is shining or the wind is blowing). Conversely, they would need to 
be very high when renewables are unavailable, in order to incentivise investors to build 
the backup fossil-fuel generation required to stabilise the system.3  
 
3. Cross Country Case Studies 
The problems faced by economies with small power systems in market reforms are 
similar to those faced by larger systems, although with varying intensity (Besant-Jones, 
2006). However, small systems have a range of options available to them, without 
risking market disruption or hindering market design. These can support the 
development of renewable energy alongside restructuring the sector to operate more 
efficiently. The size of small electricity systems also limits the disruptive effects of a 
large-scale integration of renewables. This has been demonstrated for instance in small 
electricity systems in Central America. In this section, we provide an overview on the 
status of power sector reforms and renewable energy development in Nicaragua, El 
Salvador and Australia’s Northern Territory using a cross-country case study approach. 
We describe some specific characteristics to portray the underlying context in which 
power sector reforms have been implemented in these economies. 
                                                          
3 This precludes the availability of storage at some point in the future. High prices would be needed for 
backup generation given the unpredictability of wind or solar energy, as backup generators would not 
know whether their plants would be dispatched. See Keay et al. (2013) for a thorough exposition. 
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The use of multi-country case studies is a popular technique to study the process and 
outcomes of electricity sector reforms in many developing and developed countries 
(Jamasb et al., 2017). Case studies can examine issues that do not easily lend themselves 
to rigorous quantitative analysis or that cannot be analysed due to the unavailability of 
disaggregated data. Further, the relatively sparse number of small systems in existence4 
limits our case selection to some extent, which is largely based on three parameters: 
(a) They fit the characteristics of small electricity systems as outlined in Section 2. 
(b) They have common objectives in electricity reforms, namely – improving access and 
harnessing and scaling up their significant renewables potential. 
(c) These are countries/territories that presently have (or are aiming to adopt) 
sophisticated competitive trading arrangements in their wholesale power markets, 
despite being small in size. 
 
We focus on two countries with smaller systems in Latin America - a continent with 
substantial experience in electricity market reforms – which have also successfully 
scaled up renewables. Power sector reform has been widely adopted in Latin America 
since Chile’s pioneering efforts in the 1980s in opening up the sector to private 
participation and competition (Pollitt, 2004; Millan, 2005) and has experienced some of 
the largest absolute increases in renewable energy investment among all developing 
world regions, totalling US$ 16.4 billion (6% of the global total) in 2015 with Chile, 
Brazil and Mexico recognised within the top 10 largest renewable energy markets 
globally (IRENA, 2016).5 Furthermore, Nicaragua has a generation target of attaining 
                                                          
4 See Table 1A. 
5 This also includes investments in hydropower. 
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91% of its energy from renewables by 2027, while El Salvador has set technology 
specific targets for the scaling up of renewables. 
Our third case study is Australia’s Northern Territory. Recent reforms in the Territory’s 
electricity sector have involved harmonisation of the local institutional framework with 
the national frameworks of the Australian Energy Regulator (AER) and the Australian 
Energy Market Commission (AEMC) (NT Government, 2016). Hence, the institutional 
framework for intraregional market expansion - by interconnecting the Territory to the 
larger National Electricity Market (NEM) - is already in place, since these markets are 
also becoming subject to national energy laws and rules. Nicaragua and El Salvador are 
part of the SIEPAC interconnection- which has substantially benefitted their market 
reform and renewables integration goals – and the Northern Territory is similarly 
placed within Australia. 
Nicaragua and El Salvador have a tropical climate with pronounced dry and wet seasons 
as does Australia’s Northern Territory. They have installed capacities of 1345.77 MW 
and 1695.05 MW respectively. Both of these economies have significant potential for 
solar, geothermal and wind energy (IRENA, 2016).6 Figure 1 shows that the shares of 
renewable electricity generation capacity (MW) during 2015 were 29% and 42% in El 
Salvador and Nicaragua respectively – indeed, investments in renewable energy 
generation are almost at par with non-renewable energy in Nicaragua. Each of these 
countries attracted approximately 314 million USD and 857 million USD investments in 
clean energy between 2011 and 2015. 
 
                                                          
6 El Salvador has the highest geothermal energy production in Central America (with 26% of energy 
generated from geothermal in 2015). 
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Figure 1: Share of installed generation capacities (MW) in 2015 
Source: CLIMATESCOPE (2016) 
 
 
In El Salvador the addition of renewable capacity aims to diversify the energy mix and 
reduce oil dependency, given that 43% of electricity generation was oil-based in 2015. 
Nicaragua, on the other hand, established an interim renewables target of 74% by 2018 
and 91% of generation, including hydropower, by 2027, in its November 2013 national 
plan for electricity expansion. Electricity reforms to move from a vertically integrated 
monopoly structure to the opening up of generation, transmission, and distribution 
segments to competition were initiated around the same time in both economies - in 
2000 by Nicaragua and in 1997 by El Salvador (Barosso and Perez-Arriaga, 2010). The 
energy markets of both countries are neither fully vertically integrated nor fully 
liberalised, perhaps demonstrating the limits of competition. 
The electricity system in the Northern Territory, on the other hand, has transitioned 
from a state-run to a market-based system by undertaking the accounting separation of 
the previously vertically integrated system. The Territory is looking into competitive 
market designs of its wholesale and retail sectors. Approximately 99% of grid-supplied 
electricity in the NT is currently generated by natural gas, with 1% sourced from 
renewables. 
29%
71%
El Salvador
Clean Energy
Non-Clean
Energy
42%
58%
Nicaragua
Clean Energy
Non-Clean
Energy
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3.1. Electricity Market Reforms in Nicaragua, El Salvador and Northern Territory 
Electricity market reforms in Nicaragua were initiated as early as in 1994. Prior to this, 
all operational and regulatory functions were assigned either explicitly or implicitly to 
the state-owned monopoly Instituto Nicaraguense de Energia (INE). The operational 
functions of INE were spun off into a new company, Empresa Nicaraguense de 
Electricidad (ENEL) in 1995, whilst regulatory functions stayed with INE. Electricity 
reform legislation was passed in 1998 which put in place the following elements (World 
Bank, 2012): 
 
 A wholesale market with multiple generating companies, remunerated in 
accordance with a spot price determined as system marginal cost of production 
(audited variable generation costs), 
 A contracts market established through the Supply Guarantee Obligations 
involving generation and distribution companies and large consumers which 
provides hedging against currency fluctuations in the spot market, and 
 A regulated market of end-consumers, served by distribution companies at prices 
determined by the regulator (INE). 
 
The Nicaraguan electricity sector was also unbundled into a single transmission 
company (ENATREL) also in charge of system dispatch; ENEL’s generation assets were 
segregated for privatisation, while its distribution assets and functions were unbundled 
into two new companies and privatised (World Bank, 2012). Nicaragua’s thermal (oil-
based) and geothermal generation assets were privatised whereas its hydro assets were 
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not.7 Notably, the government created a separate state entity - Comision Nacional de 
Energia (CNE) - in charge of planning, policy, rural electrification and legal initiatives. 
The MEM (the Ministry of Energy and Mines) was created as a successor to CNE as a 
result of a 2007 legislation, with additional functions that were transferred from INE 
such as licensing and oil and hydrocarbon policies, as well as the approval of regulations 
and norms in the energy and mines sector (ESMAP, 2011). 
In El Salvador, the development of the energy sector was in the hands of the state since 
the early 1940s. The energy sector underwent reforms that sought to redefine the role 
of the State in the sector in the 1990’s (National Energy Council of El Salvador, 2016). 
Reforms started by allowing SIGET (Superintendencia General de Electricidad y 
Telecommunications) - which has been in operation since 1997 - to be in charge of 
regulating the industry. It was created as an autonomous body with its own budget and 
equity. A new regulatory framework created the environment for a more competitive 
power sector at the wholesale and retail levels. An energy exchange has also been in 
operation since April 1998. The Salvadorian market has a regulatory framework that 
enables all participants to freely operate in generation, transmission and distribution 
activities. The current El Salvador electricity market is comprised of the following 
structural framework (National Energy Council of El Salvador, 2016): 
 A wholesale spot market (MRS) where the MRS price is production cost-based. 
Hence, the price of energy depends on variable costs associated with fuel costs, 
and compensation for every MWh of power made available. Moreover, in early 
2005, the remuneration of generators at the marginal cost of generation in the 
                                                          
7 Primarily as it did not attract much private sector interest; also, the hydro storage capacity was limited. 
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spot market was replaced by a ‘pay–as–bid’ scheme to account for higher spot 
prices due to increasing fuel prices (ESMAP, 2011). 
 A ‘competitively bid’ long term contracts market (CLP) subject to firm capacity 
availability involving generators and distribution companies under the 
supervision of SIGET, where the contracts are financially settled (in terms of 
monetary values than physically (MWh)) and stabilize energy prices for final 
users. 
 A regulated market of end-consumers, served by distribution companies at prices 
determined by the regulator. 
 
The restructuring led to the unbundling of generation, transmission and distribution 
activities and to the horizontal division of generation and distribution into several 
companies. The state-owned generator, CEL, maintained ownership of hydroelectric 
plants and created ETESAL (the Salvadoran Transmission Company) as a subsidiary 
company while all other distribution and thermal generation companies were 
privatized. UT (the Transaction Unit) was also created as a private company in charge of 
system operations and of the administration of the wholesale electricity market (MEM) 
(ESMAP, 2011). In 2007, a legislation creating the National Energy Council (CNE), as the 
highest authority on energy policy and the coordinating body for the different energy 
sectors was approved. Table 1 captures the normative, regulatory and design aspects of 
the electricity markets in Nicaragua and El Salvador. 
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 Nicaragua El Salvador 
Initiation of Reforms 1994 1997 
Normative Entity MEM  CNE 
Regulator INE SIGET 
System Operator CNDC of ENATREL UT 
Market 
Operator/Administrator 
CNDC UT 
Transmission Company ENTRESA ETESAL 
Vertical Integration No Yes (separate account) 
Market Model Wholesale Competition Retail Competition * 
Generators 12 16 
Transmitters 1 1 
Distributors 5 5 
Traders 0 11 
Large Consumers 9 2 
Economic dispatch Cost based Price bids 
Spot market price 
Short Run Marginal Cost 
with no Transmission 
constraints 
Average of prices based on bid 
prices of dispatched generators 
with transmission constraints 
Spot market 
Hourly energy price: 
marginal cost 
Hourly energy price: marginal 
price 
Spot market dispatch 
Economic dispatch based on 
variable costs 
Economic dispatch based on prices 
and transmission capacities 
Traded Products 
Power (MW) and Energy 
(MWh) 
Power (MW) and Energy (MWh) 
Capacity Payment Yes Yes ** 
Long-term contracts *** Tender (80% of demand) Negotiated **** 
Contracts Financial Physical 
Limit of Large Consumers 2000 KW 0 KW 
Transmission charges: Losses Transmissions losses pay by 
demand 
Transmission losses paid by 
generators 
Private participation Generation= more than 70% 
of installed capacity; 
Distribution = 100% 
Generation = 70% of installed 
capacity; Distribution= 100% 
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*Distribution companies operate under regulated rates and quality constraints. However, based on El 
Salvador´s current regulations, competition is allowed in distribution even within the same geographical 
area. 
 
** The Long Term Contracts (CLP) ensure a guaranteed income independent of the actual energy 
production. 
 
*** Distributors in Nicaragua must have contracted, in advance, 80% of their forecasted demand (for 
power and energy) for the following year and 60% for the subsequent year. In El Salvador, distributors 
must contract 50% of their forecasted demand (for the first year), with a maximum of 25% for each 
independent contract. 
 
**** Public tenders are used by distribution companies in Latin American wholesale electricity markets to 
select the most favourable electricity supply contracts with generation companies. Such processes are 
regulated and supervised by the regulatory bodies of each country such as SIGET in El Salvador. 
 
 
Table 1: Electricity Market Features across different Jurisdictions 
Source: Based on ESMAP (2011) 
 
A notable difference between EL Salvador and other Latin American markets is that the 
electricity Law technically authorizes vertical integration in generation, transmission, 
distribution and supply - while generation, distribution and supply companies are 
prohibited from owning shares in ETESAL. This arrangement, coupled with the 
existence of a price -based spot market with retail competition for all consumers 
(including large consumers), makes the wholesale electricity market in El Salvador 
unique, as it preserves competition. From the discussions above, it is clear that 
Nicaragua and El Salvador, while injecting limited competition, have retained regulatory 
control over some parts of their electricity systems. 
Australia’s Northern Territory Electricity Market (NTEM) is another example of a 
reforming smaller market.  The NT market is characterised by a small size (around 700 
MW of on-grid installed capacity) with scattered networks, many of which serve the low 
density loads of remotely based indigenous communities, and often exposed to extreme 
weather conditions. Its location close to the tropics implies that the NT is also endowed 
with substantial solar energy resources. 
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The NT market operated as a vertically and horizontally integrated multi-utilities 
business from the 1980’s until 2014 under the Power and Water Corporation (PWC). 
The Territory embarked on a set of reform measures in 2012 to promote competition 
and efficiency in the electricity supply industry. These measures also targeted the 
greater alignment of regulatory arrangements with those operating in Australia’s 
National Electricity Market (NEM)8, with a view to improving efficiency and outcomes 
for Territory electricity consumers (NT Government, 2014). The Northern Territory 
electricity market is unique as it represents a small reforming power system located 
within the same Australian national border. 
Reform measures so far have included the split of the incumbent PWC into three 
separate state-owned contestable and regulated entities in accounting and legal terms in 
July, 2014, namely: Territory Generation (the largest electricity producer owning 592 
Mega Watts (MW) of installed capacity and contracting an additional 114.5 MW from the 
Independent Power Producers (IPPS)) under a standard generation licensee; Power and 
Water (responsible for managing the networks) and Jacana Energy (the energy retailer). 
Further measures included the transfer of economic regulation of networks to the 
Australian Energy Regulator (AER); establishment of an organized wholesale market, 
and reform of the retail sector. The Territory is looking to the NEM as a model even 
though energy-only markets are debated as being unsuitable for renewable energy 
integration, as discussed in Section 2 (NT Government, 2016). 
The electricity sector in the NT is regulated by the statutory framework instituted in 
2000 involving various legislations administered by the Utilities Commission, including 
the Utilities Commission Act, Electricity Reform Act, and Electricity Networks (Third 
                                                          
8 The NEM is the Australian wholesale electricity market operating in Queensland, New South Wales, 
Tasmania, Victoria and South Australia. 
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Bilateral contracts 
Party Access) Act. This statutory framework is primarily responsible for regulation of 
the electricity sector in the Darwin-Katherine, Alice Springs and Tennant Creek power 
systems (also referred to as the regulated systems). 
Structural reforms in 2012 followed the commencement of the Interim Northern 
Territory Electricity Market (I-NTEM) in May 2015 (Nepal and Menezes, 2017). The I-
NTEM introduced an efficient economic dispatch of generation and basic market 
operation functions, providing a framework to facilitate the wholesale arrangements of 
electricity between electricity generators and retailers. 
The establishment of a market operator (MO) along with the existing system controller 
(SC) supports the overall reform initiatives by removing dispatch decisions from the 
previously vertically integrated entity. Consumers are allowed to purchase electricity 
from any licensed retailer approved by the Utilities Commission. The market operator is 
also responsible for the publication of market data including daily market prices and 
virtual settlement statements to market participants. Figure 2 outlines the stricture of 
the I-NTEM market. Table 2 details out the underlying features of this market. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: The I-NTEM 
Source: Reproduced from Power and Water 
(https://www.powerwater.com.au/networks_and_infrastructure/market_operator) 
Generators INTEM Retailers Consumers 
System controller Market 
operator 
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 Northern Territory * 
Initiation of Reforms 2000 
Normative Entity NTEM 
Regulator Utilities Commission (under AER) 
System Operator Power and Water 
Market 
Operator/Administrator 
Power and Water 
Transmission Company Power and Water 
Vertical Integration Yes (separate account) 
Market Model Retail Competition 
Generators 9 ** 
Transmitters 1 
Distributors 1 
Traders 6 
Large Consumers - 
Economic dispatch Price bids 
Spot market price 
Short Run Marginal Cost with Transmission 
constraints (in the NEM) 
Spot market Half hourly energy price: marginal price 
Spot market dispatch 
Economic dispatch based on prices and 
transmission capacities 
Traded Products Energy (MWh) 
Capacity Payment No 
Long-term contracts Negotiated 
Contracts Physical 
Limit of Large Consumers 2 GWh 
Transmission Charges: Losses Transmissions losses pay by demand 
Private Participation Generation = 16.26% of installed capacity 
* It must be noted that many features of the NTEM are still being discussed since 
the market is in an interim stage. 
** See Utilities Commission (2016). 
Table 2: Electricity Market Features in the NTEM 
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One of the prominent features of the I-NTEM is bilateral contracting of electricity 
between retailers and generators. This form of contracting is appealing for countries 
with small power systems and weak institutional capacity (Bacon and Besant-Jones, 
2001). The bilateral contracts provide for competition only at the time of bidding for the 
right to secure such contracts. They do not allow competition to develop as trade takes 
place in the market. As such, bilateral trading is the most common successor to a single 
buyer once the basic requirements for competition in the market are met (Besant-Jones, 
2006). Settlement for the contracted power is also carried out bilaterally, and each 
distributor is financially responsible for its own contracts under bilateral trading. 
The Darwin-Katherine interconnected system is the only interconnected system linked 
by a 132 kV transmission line from Darwin to Katherine representing three quarters of 
the total Territory Generation Capacity. The power networks are highly scattered (see 
Figure 1A). More than 5800km of overhead lines, 3000km of underground cable and 
40,000 poles connect Territorians to the electricity network (Power and Water, 2017). 
The Darwin-Katherine, Tennant Creek and Alice Springs networks are not 
interconnected and are separated by long distances. There are six licensed electricity 
retailers in the Territory, namely: Power and Water, Jacana Energy, Energy, ERM Power 
Retail Pty Limited, Rimfire Energy and EDL NGD (NT) Pty Limited (Utilities Commission, 
2016). The predominant fuel sources used in the Northern Territory for electricity 
generation are gas, liquid fuels (such as diesel and heavy fuel oil) and with only a small 
proportion (one percent) from renewable energy. 
The I-NTEM is in a transition stage towards a fuller NTEM (Nepal and Menezes, 2017). 
Wholesale prices are determined by bilateral contracting and generator dispatch is 
determined based on the generators offers as there are no financial transactions 
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currently taking place in the I-NTEM. Moreover, the generators utilise the I-NTEM 
settlement statements to determine the settlement quantities for their bilateral 
contracting arrangements (NT Government, 2016). The virtual settlement price is an 
‘energy-only’ price and does not contain additional components such as capacity 
payments to ensure capacity availability. Unlike El Salvador and Nicaragua, the NTEM 
remains isolated from regional interconnections, but interconnection to the National 
Electricity Market (NEM) and Wholesale Electricity Market (WEM) in Western Australia 
is an option. 
 
3.2. Renewable Energy Development in Nicaragua, El Salvador and Northern 
Territory 
Shortly after implementing electricity reforms, Nicaragua began implementing parallel 
legislation in 2005 to expand the share of renewable energy in electricity in its “Law for 
the Promotion of Electricity Generation with Renewable Sources”. It set a non-binding 
target for 91% of electricity generation from renewables by 2027. The “National 
Sustainable Electrification and Renewable Energy Program” was launched in 2010, which 
linked the expansion of renewables to rural electrification. A fund was established (the 
Energy Investment and Development Fund) for this purpose, which is funded through tax 
(VAT) receipts. Renewable energy developers enjoy a full range of tax breaks, including 
import duty, VAT and income tax exemptions. Electricity distributors must allocate a 
share to renewable power in their tenders for electricity with biomass, geothermal, 
hydro, wind and solar being the priority sectors9. Electricity generation can also be 
                                                          
9 INE defines the percentage allocated for renewables in tenders based on the strategic expansion plan 
originating from the MEM. 
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contracted through bilateral contracts between generators and distributors and large 
consumers. 
Nicaragua’s main policy supporting renewable development is Law 532. It mandates 
renewable energy tenders for the biomass, geothermal, hydro, wind and solar sectors. 
INE is responsible for defining the percentage allocated for renewables in tenders based 
on MEM’s strategic expansion plan. Generators that do not have contracts with 
distributors or large consumers may sell their power in the spot market, where they can 
receive a price determined by near-term supply and demand conditions. The law also 
offers a variety of tax incentives for renewable projects. In addition to national 
exemptions, developers receive a reduction on municipal taxes. The government 
implemented a new pricing benchmark (reference price) for renewable energy 
technologies in to improve the competitiveness of clean energy sources in the country in 
2015.10 These reference prices apply to biomass, geothermal, hydro, solar and wind 
projects. Prices vary from $66-$80 per MWh (lowest range) for wind projects up to 
$103-$118 per MWh (highest range) for solar plants. 
El Salvador’s National Energy Policy aims to add technology-specific capacities of 60 
MW wind, 90 MW solar PV, 200 MW solar thermal, 60-89 MW geothermal, small hydro 
(<20 MW) 162.7 MW, 45 MW biomass and 35 MW biogas by 2026 (IRENA, 2015). The 
country floats technology-specific renewable energy tenders, alongside offering income 
and import tax exemptions to clean energy projects. Tenders have been introduced to 
replace bilateral power agreements and encourage renewable energy contracts. The 
first auction for renewable capacity took place in 2014, and contracted 94MW of solar 
                                                          
10 The processes involved in determining the reference prices are not publicised clearly. However, we 
expect the reference prices to cover both capex (capital expenditure) and opex (operating expenditure) i.e. 
the totex (total expenditure) to make the renewable energy projects viable. 
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PV capacity to come online in 2016. Capacity was contracted at an average price of 
$116.2 per MWh under 20-year power purchase agreements. The bidding in a second 
renewable energy tender opened in February 2016. It aimed to contract up to 150MW of 
wind and solar PV projects for a maximum duration of 20 years from 2019. 
El Salvador grants tax incentives for development of renewable energy sources, 
including 10 years of import tax exemption to machines and equipment, and income tax 
breaks for renewable energy projects under decree 462 of 2007. The sale of credits 
under the UN’s Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) for renewable energy projects is 
additionally not subject to income tax. Furthermore, ETESAL is required to guarantee 
priority dispatch, as in Nicaragua, to electricity generated from renewable sources. 
Table 2 enumerates the existing renewable energy policies and instruments in the 
energy sectors of Nicaragua and El Salvador. 
 
 Nicaragua El Salvador 
National Policy 
 Renewable Energy Target 
 Renewable Energy 
Law/Strategy 
 Geothermal Law/Programme 
 Biomass Law/Programme 
 Biofuels Law/ Programme 
 Renewable Energy Target 
 Solar Power Law/Programme 
Fiscal Incentives 
 VAT Exemption 
 Income Tax Exemption 
 Import/Export Fiscal Benefit 
 National Exemption of Local 
Taxes 
 Other Fiscal Benefits 
 Income Tax Exemption 
 Import/Export Fiscal Benefit 
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Grid Access 
 Preferential Dispatch 
 Other Grid Benefits such as 
planning or other fee 
exemptions 
 Preferential Dispatch 
 Grid Access 
Regulatory Instruments 
 Auctions 
 Feed-in- Tariff 
 Quota 
 Hybrid 
 Auctions 
 Hybrid 
 Net Metering 
Finance 
 Currency hedging 
 Dedicated Fund 
 Eligible Fund 
 Guarantees 
 Pre-investment support 
 Currency hedging 
 Dedicated Fund 
 Guarantees 
 Pre-investment support 
 Direct Funding 
Other 
 Renewable Energy in Rural 
Access Programme 
 Renewable Energy Cookstove 
Programme 
 Special Environmental 
Regulations 
 Renewable Energy in Rural 
Access Programme 
 Social Requirements 
 Special Environmental 
Regulations 
 
Table 2: Instruments for Renewable Energy Development 
Source: Based on IRENA (2015); CLIMATESCOPE (2016) 
 
The electricity market reforms of Nicaragua and El Salvador have taken into 
consideration the limitations to competition from the small size of their systems in 
relation to the design of their respective national wholesale markets. Economic dispatch 
is centralized and based on audited variable costs (except in El Salvador, where it was 
based on prices, but is poised to change to variable costs) (ESMAP, 2011). Both have 
established competitive wholesale electricity markets and implemented vertical and 
horizontal unbundling of generation, transmission and distribution activities to a 
varying extent. Alongside this, Central America has the largest share of renewables 
(56%) and one of the world’s most diverse mixtures of renewable generation, composed 
of biomass, geothermal, wind, solar and hydro (Norton Rose Fulbright, 2017). 
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Both Nicaragua and El Salvador participate in an interconnected power system; namely, 
the Central American Electrical Interconnection System (SIEPAC). SIEPAC is an 
interconnection of the power grids of six Central American nations including Panama, 
Costa Rica, Honduras, Nicaragua, El Salvador and Guatemala. The objective of SIEPAC is 
to alleviate periodic power shortages in the region, reduce operating costs, optimize the 
use of renewable energy including hydroelectric power, create a competitive energy 
market in the region, and attract foreign investment in power generation and 
transmission systems (ICER, 2015). 
The NT labour government has nevertheless adopted an ambitious renewable energy 
target of 50% by 2030 (Territory Labor, 2015). Hence, there may exist opportunities to 
align the economic objectives of electricity reforms with climate objectives in the early 
stages of the NT’s reforms. However, uncertainty exists regarding the alignment of 
electricity reform objectives with climate-related objectives in smaller systems such as 
the NT, given the ongoing “industry transformation”. The ability of the electricity 
industry to resolve the energy policy “trilemma” of security of  supply, affordability and 
sustainability is also being questioned and is attracting increasing support (see, e.g., 
Keay, 2016 and Pollitt, 2012 for the European context Simshauser, 2014; Nelson et al., 
2015 for the Australian context and PJM, 2016 for the US context). 
The NT Climate Change Action Policy (2009) established an ambitious goal of 60% 
reduction in emissions level by 2050 (based on 2007 levels) and of becoming a world 
leader in providing green energy in remote areas (Climate Council 2014). However, 
there are currently no formal climate policies, near-term emissions-reduction targets or 
specific implementation plans to harness RE sources. At the same time, the electricity 
sector has a key role to play towards decarbonisation. 
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4. Policy Lessons and Discussion 
Several policy options are proposed below for other small electricity systems that are 
experiencing reforms in the advent of industry transformation. These policy options 
may also be particularly useful for smaller countries located in geographically complex 
settings such as the in the Asia-Pacific, South East Asia and the Caribbean where reforms 
are ongoing alongside policies to decarbonize their economies. 
 
4.1. Increasing Private Participation in the Contestable Segments 
Both Nicaragua and El Salvador have significant private sector participation in the 
contestable segments of their ESI (generation and distribution) unlike the Northern 
Territory. In both of these markets, the IPP(s) are allowed to sign direct long-term 
contracts with the retailers as opposed to in the NT. In El Salvador, large consumers can 
purchase electricity directly from generators. Clean energy investments, including 
private sector investments, in El Salvador have increased from 14.32 million USD to 
328.26 million USD in 2015, while in Nicaragua, investments increased from 423.45 
million USD to 1279.93 million USD (CLIMATESCOPE, 2016).11 
Therefore, a standard first step to electricity market reform in small systems is to allow 
Independent Power Producers (IPPs) to sell electricity into the wholesale market. Entry 
can be encouraged in the short-term through favourable (negotiated) power purchase 
agreements (PPAs) between the IPPS and retailers to create ‘competition in the market’. 
                                                          
11 The government of Nicaragua announced the decision to invest $10m in renewable energy projects 
during 2016. In April 2016, South Korea’s government confirmed that it would lend $33.3m to the 
government of Nicaragua for the development of solar projects in 164 rural communities. 
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The negotiated PPAs can reflect the differences in energy technologies (i.e. promoting 
renewables over non-renewables). In the longer run with more private participants, 
contracts could be auctioned or tendered as in Nicaragua and El Salvador to ‘compete for 
the market’. For instance, the use of renewable energy auctions has led to significant 
growth in renewable energy capacity in other Central American countries participating 
in the regional market, including Costa Rica, Guatemala and Panama (IRENA, 2016). 
Policy for attracting higher renewable energy investments also needs to focus on 
improving contract enforcement, thus minimising transaction costs and improving the 
credibility of the market for private investors. This can be done by streamlining the 
permitting processes to private investors and standardizing the rules for contracting 
with IPPs through PPAs. 
 
4.2. Network Arrangements 
Electricity from renewable sources is granted priority dispatch guarantee across both 
Nicaragua and El Salvador (i.e. electricity from eligible renewable energy producers is 
dispatched first). El Salvador also has guaranteed or regulated grid access for eligible 
renewable electricity producers while in Nicaragua eligible renewable energy producers 
are exempted from planning fees. Private participation through IPPs can be improved by 
changes in market rules, such as ensuring non-discriminatory access to transmission 
and distribution systems (Woolf and Halpern, 2001). Other small systems such as the NT 
could embrace these grid access policies. In addition, eligible renewable electricity 
producers can be exempted or discounted on transmission fees, while also prioritising 
electricity generated from renewables in case of grid congestion. 
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The case studies have also highlighted the importance of an independent system 
operator (ISO) such as in the case of El Salvador. The ISO has a responsibility for 
controlling the access to and use of the transmission grid by competing generators and 
retailers, including commercial solar power producers. The ISO model has been globally 
advocated as wholesale power markets have been introduced and vertically integrated 
generation monopolies have been horizontally and vertically unbundled (Chawla and 
Pollitt, 2013). However, both functions of the system controller and market operator are 
undertaken by the same entity in the NT, which contradicts the ISO model. 
 
4.3. Regional Electricity Integration 
Earlier studies on small electricity systems such as Nepal and Jamasb (2012a) and Nepal 
and Menezes (2017) have highlighted the importance of interconnections and network 
investments to facilitate the large-scale development of renewable energy. Energy 
integration and interconnections harness economies of scale and foster competition in 
smaller and concentrated wholesale markets. Nicaragua and El Salvador countries 
participate in the Regional Electricity Market (MER) through an interconnected 
electricity system (SIEPAC) based on a 203 kV transmission network spanning from 
Guatemala to Panama (1830 km long) serving 35 million customers (see Figure 2A for 
the geographical coverage of SIEPAC). The interconnected grid is beneficial in terms of 
attracting investment in generation and transmission, while lowering energy costs. This 
optimizes the shared use of renewable energy in the region and mitigates vulnerabilities 
associated with small markets, fuel price volatility and system unreliability (IDB, 2012). 
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However, a major obstacle to the success of SIEPAC has been the lack of harmonization 
of regulatory practices and policies of individual member countries.12 
Electricity market integration and the development of renewable energy requires 
adequate network infrastructure, considering that  renewable energy resources are 
distributed, and there is a need to extend existing grid networks to resource-rich and 
resource-poor zones. The lack of adequate network infrastructure and related 
investments is a barrier to renewable energy deployment.  It increases the risks and 
costs associated with prospective renewable investments. For instance, the lack of 
interconnection between the NTEM and NEM can be considered a barrier in the 
development of large-scale renewable energy projects in the NT. However, the 
harmonization of regulatory frameworks at the start is necessary to facilitate energy 
integration across small electricity systems in the longer run, as the market expands. 
 
4.4. Policies, Incentives and Support Mechanisms 
Central American governments are aware of the importance of renewable energy as a 
means to reduce their dependence on fossil fuels, evident from their advocacy of clean 
energy policies. The ambitious renewable energy targets as in Nicaragua and El Salvador 
reflects strong political will. Both countries have concrete policy mechanisms in place 
for advancing renewables such as tax incentives (in reducing costs, stimulating 
investment and increasing the competitive advantage of renewable energy sources). The 
use of tendering has been successful in scaling up renewable generation. Newer 
regulatory mechanisms such as feed-in-tariffs exist in Nicaragua while El Salvador has 
                                                          
12 See IRENA (2015). 
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introduced net-metering.13 El Salvador also has adopted a specific national policy 
through its “Solar Power Law/Programme” programme to support solar energy. 
Both El Salvador and Nicaragua have recognized the importance of the investment 
climate and of stable financing in supporting renewable energy development. Policies 
are in place to hedge against currency volatility (usually denominating policy benefits in 
USD) to encourage foreign investments. Both countries have dedicated public funding, 
such as direct public investment to exclusively finance eligible renewable energy 
projects. Support is also provided for feasibility studies, resource mapping and other 
pre-investment activities. Similar policies could be adopted across other small electricity 
systems globally to meet renewable energy targets. 
 
4.5. Opportunities for Accelerating Rural Electrification 
Renewable energy provides opportunities for electrifying rural homes since the 
technologies make best use of the local available resources. For instance, in 2014, 
Nicaragua had one of the lowest electrification rates of around 67%, among all Latin 
American countries in 1990. However, by 2014, the national electrification rate had 
increased to 82% (World Bank, 2017). The average retail electricity price is still high as 
compared to other countries ($0.21/kWh in 2014) (Norton Rose Fulbright, 2017). The 
development of renewable energy is an attractive option in these countries to expand 
electricity access. 
                                                          
13 Feed-in tariffs (FITs) and net metering are designed to accelerate innovation and investments in 
renewable energy sources by allowing energy producers to be compensated for the energy they feed into 
the grid. 
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Both Nicaragua and El Salvador have advocated a rural energy access programme that 
uses or seeks to promote renewable energy. Special environmental regulations are also 
provided for eligible renewable energy projects in rural areas. Nicaragua has also 
adopted a programme to specifically promote solar or sustainable bioenergy cook 
stoves. Other small systems like the NT can integrate these policies into the renewable 
energy development programme, displacing diesel consumption of diesel among remote 
(and indigenous) communities. 
 
5. Conclusions 
This paper reviewed the experience of electricity reform in small systems alongside the 
development of renewable energy. We examined the experiences of Nicaragua and El 
Salvador, and applied these to Australia’s Northern Territory system, which is 
undergoing reforms and poised for an “industry transformation”. Both El Salvador and 
Nicaragua liberalised their electricity markets, unbundled their vertically integrated 
utilities, and opened generation, transmission, and distribution to competition and 
private sector. Reforms in the Northern Territory are ongoing. Contrary to the debate 
over the suitability of the standard reform model in renewable energy integration, these 
countries are continuing to expand renewable energy despite the range of fossil fuel 
(often subsidised) options in the markets. 
The case studies have underscored that electricity sector reforms and renewables can be 
complementary when supported by appropriate instruments and incentives in small 
electricity systems. The economic theory of market failures suggests that goods and 
service with positive externalities, such as renewable energy, are always under-
produced when left to the market due to free-riding. However, market-based 
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interventions in the form of incentives and instruments can create a level playing field 
for both renewable and non-renewable technologies to compete and co-exist in small 
electricity systems as well, something which has been advocated by earlier studies on 
other world regions. 
National policies with renewable energy targets and renewable-technology specific law; 
fiscal incentives through tax exemptions and support for the export and import of 
renewable energy/equipment; network arrangements such as non-discriminatory grid 
access and preferential grid dispatch; regulatory instruments such as capacity payments 
and net metering, and financing arrangements to attract private investments (both 
domestic and foreign) can help foster renewable energy development across small 
electricity systems. The role of private sector participation in generation and retail 
markets, interconnections, and the opportunity to align renewable energy development 
with expanding energy access in remote regions and communities are important in 
expanding renewable energy use in small systems. 
Future research should focus on the capability of network infrastructure to support the 
high penetration of renewables and other network related loads, such as grid-based 
energy storage and plug-in vehicles, in the midst of ongoing industry transformation 
across small systems. The role of smart grids and smart network regulation in 
facilitating large-scale penetration of renewable into the grid is also a future area of 
research involving small electricity systems. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Asia 
Syste
m Size 
(GW) 
Caribbean 
System 
Size 
(GW) 
Pacific 
System 
Size 
(GW) 
Africa, Indian 
Ocean, 
Mediterranea
n and South 
China Sea 
(AIMS) 
System 
Size 
(GW) 
Europe  
and others 
System 
size 
Mongolia  1  Jamaica  1  
Papua 
New 
Guinea 
0.9  Senegal 1  Montenegro 0.9 
Nepal 0.8  Bahamas 0.6 Guam 0.6 Uganda 0.771 Malta 0.62 
Brunei 0.78 Suriname 0.4 
New 
Caledonia 
0.6 Gabon 0.6 Andorra 0.52 
Afghanista
n 
0.6 Guyana 0.4 Fiji 0.3 Mali 0.6 Moldova 0.5 
Macau 0.5 Aruba 0.3 
French 
Polynesia 
0.2 Guinea 0.5 
Faroe 
Islands 
0.1 
West Bank 0.1 Haiti 0.3 
Marshall 
Islands 
0.052 Namibia 0.5 Greenland 0.096 
Maldives 0.082 
American 
Virgin 
Islands 
0.3 Samoa 0.045 Madagascar 0.5 Gibraltar 0.043 
  Barbados 0.2 
American 
Samoa 
0.041 Congo 0.5 
Saint Pierre 
and 
Miquelon 
0.028 
  Belize 0.2 
Solomon 
Islands 
0.037 Malawi 0.4 
Falkland 
Islands 
0.01 
  
Cayman 
Islands 
0.1 Vanuatu 0.030 Mauritania 0.4 Saint Helena 0.008 
  Saint Lucia 0.088 
Micronesi
a 
0.018 Burkina Faso 0.3   
  
Antigua and 
Barbuda 
0.084 Tonga 0.017 South Sudan 0.255   
  
Turks and 
Caicos 
Islands 
0.076 
Cook 
Islands 
0.009 Swaziland 0.2   
  
Saint Kitts 
and Nevis 
0.0642 Kiribati 0.007 
Equatorial 
Guinea 
0.2   
  Grenada 0.050 Tuvalu 0.0051 Bermuda 0.167   
  
Saint 
Vincent and 
the 
Grenadines 
0.047 Nauru 0.005 Benin 0.163   
  
British 
Virgin 
Islands 
0.044 Niue 0.001 Botswana 0.1   
  Dominica 0.0332   Djibouti 0.1   
  Montserrat 0.005   Cape Verde 0.1   
      Rwanda 0.1   
      Seychelles 0.1   
      Sierra Leone 0.1   
      Niger 0.1   
      Eritrea 0.1   
      Gambia 0.091   
      Togo 0.086   
      Somalia 0.081   
      Lesotho 0.080   
      Burundi 0.066   
      
Western 
Sahara 
0.058   
      
Central 
African 
0.044   
39 
 
Republic 
      Chad 0.041   
      Guinea-Bissau 0.039   
      Liberia 0.027   
      Comoros 0.022   
      
Sao Tome and 
Principe 
0.020   
Table 1A: 88 small Electricity Systems around the world with installed capacity of ≤1 GW 
based on 2014 estimates 
Source: Adapted from United Nations Energy Statistics Database, UN (2017) 
http://data.un.org/Data.aspx?d=EDATA&f=cmID%3AEC 
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Figure 1A: The I-NTEM 
Source: Adapted from Power and Water (2017) 
(https://www.powerwater.com.au/networks_and_infrastructure/power_networks) 
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Figure 2A: The SIEPAC 
Source: Reproduced from EPR SIEPAC  
 
(https://www.eprsiepac.com/contenido/) 
 
